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OF "SLOPPY JOURNALISM," "CORPORATE TYRANNY,"




It's a compelling (if technologically dated) image: "the lonely
pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph,"' assert-
ing First Amendment freedoms in the face of powerful interests.
And, indeed, for many years, free speech law arose out of the
courage of political activists of various stripes,2 Jehovah's Wit-
nesses,3 and muckrakers,4 people on the fringes of society with
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. Thanks to John Buchan, Bob
Cochran, Mike Curtis, Miles Foy, Wayne Logan, John Noyes, Jeanne Wine, and Ron
Wright, who reviewed and commented on an earlier draft, and to the School of Law
for a research grant.
1. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing conviction of pro-
tester who wore jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in courthouse);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (reversing conviction of
Ku Klux Klan leader for his "mere advocacy" of lawless action); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding conviction for criminal anarchy arising out of the
publication of the platform of the Socialist Party); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding conviction for printing and circulating materials urging
draft resistance).
3. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (overturning trespass convic-
tion of Jehovah's Witness who distributed religious literature on the streets of a
company town); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (overturning conviction of
Jehovah's Witness who violated ordinance that' criminalized door-to-door leafletting
by passing out announcements of a religious meeting).
4. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (reversing one
million dollar libel judgment against an out-of-state newspaper that. ran an adver-
tisement critical of the handling of civil rights demonstrations by the Montgomery,
Alabama, police); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. '697, 702 (1931) (overturning injunc-
tion imposed upon a newspaper "in the business of regularly . . . publishing ...
malicious, scandalous and defamatory" articles that alleged collusion between orga-
nized crime and elected officials) (quoting Mason's Minnesota Statutes, 1927,, 10123-1
to 10123-3).
161
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:161
iconoclastic beliefs that irritated, and sometimes threatened, the
status quo.
This image, still as powerful as it was decades ago, is fast
becoming a romantic picture of a society past.5 These days, free
speech law is as likely to be made at the behest of corporations
whose position in society is secure.6
This Article tells the story of how for a brief time-eleven
weeks-the mighty New York Times was brought to its knees by
a lone journalist, Dan Moldea.7 It tells of an influential appel-
late court that first sided with a little guy and then, in the face
of a barrage of scathing criticism from the media and a display
of the prodigious legal talent at the Times's disposal, just weeks
later reversed itself.8 The incident at once sheds light on an
important and volatile area of First Amendment law, the judicial
process, and the nature of the mass media in the 1990s.
II. THE GENERAL CONTExT: FROM GERTZ TO MILKOVICH
It all began with a dictum. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,9 the
United States Supreme Court faced the question of whether the
strong protections provided to the media in New York Times v.
Sullivan" in suits brought by "public" plaintiffs would also be
5. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE
5 (1990) (arguing that the First Amendment is intended "to protect the roman-
tics . . . the dissenters, the unorthodox, the outcasts"; its purpose is to "sponsor the
individualism, the rebelliousness, the antiauthoritarianism, the spirit of nonconformi-
ty within us all").
6. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (holding that offers to sell products are protected by the First Amendment);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (finding campaign contributions to be a form of
political speech protected by the First Amendment); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that the First Amendment allows a newspaper
to refuse to print a reply from a political candidate that it had attacked).
7. See Moldea v. New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir.) (Moldea 1), rev'd,
22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994).
8. See Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir.) (Moldea I), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994).
9. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
10. 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (holding that a public official must prove that the
defendant published with "'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that [the state-
ment] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"). This
constitutional privilege was extended to claims brought by public figures in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In the years since New York Times v.
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available in libel actions brought by "private" plaintiffs." Jus-
tice Powell observed:
We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea. However perni-
cious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not
on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition
of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact.
12
Alas, despite this glowing rhetoric, Elmer Gertz's libel claim
had nothing to do with "ideas" or "opinions"; he sued because of
allegations in a right-wing publication that he had a long police
record, was a "Leninist" and "Communist," and an architect of a
plot to cripple the Chicago police force. 3 Nevertheless, by 1990
every federal circuit and the courts of at least thirty-six states
and the District of Columbia recognized that a statement of
opinion was absolutely protected because, according to Gertz,
"[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as false
idea." 4 Similarly, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts concluded that Gertz was so far-reaching as to render
redundant the related common-law doctrine of "fair comment." 5
Sullivan, the Court has provided a number of other constitutional protections to
media defendants, both substantive and procedural. See David A. Logan, Tort Law
and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 493, 505-15
(1990).
11. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.
12. Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
13. See id. at 326.
14. ROBERT D. SACK, & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROB-
LEMS § 4.2.3.1, at 208-10 (2d ed. 1994); see also Cianci v. New Times Publishing
Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly, J.) (stating that the Gertz dictum "has
become the opening salvo in all arguments for protection from defamation actions on
the ground of opinion, even though the case did not remotely concern the question").
15. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1977). Fair comment was one
of an array of extra-constitutional privileges provided by common law to blunt the
threat to free expression represented by the strict liability nature of defamation. See
BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 5.2 (2d ed. 1993); see also Peck v. Tri-
bune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909) (Holmes, J.) (quoting Lord Mansfield in Rex v.
Woodfell, Lofft, 776, 781, 98 Eng. Rep. 914, 916 (1774)) ("Whatever a man publishes,
he publishes at his peril."). In general, fair comment "afford[ed] legal immunity for
the honest expression of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest when based
upon a true or privileged statement of fact." 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING
JAMES, JR., LAW OF TORTS § 5.28, at 456 (1956) (footnote omitted). Most jurisdictions
1995]
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Lacking guidance from the Supreme Court as to how to apply
the fact/opinion distinction, the lower courts adopted one of
several related approaches. The majority rule, at least for feder-
al courts, came from the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. In Olman v. Evans,6 Judge Ken-
neth Starr, writing for a highly fragmented en banc court,'
announced a four-part test to determine whether a particular
statement was an opinion and thus absolutely protected by the
First Amendment." First, did the common usage of the words
have a sufficiently precise meaning to convey a definite mes-
sage?9 Second, was the statement verifiable-susceptible to
empirical proof or disproof?' Third, did the specific context in
which the offending statement occurred signal to readers that
the statement should not be taken in a literal sense?2' Finally,
did the broader "social context" in which the statement occurred
(such as an editorial or comedy) alert readers to expect some-
allowed the privilege only if the underlying facts were proved to be true and the
speaker reasonable. See SANFORD, supra, § 5.2. As a result, fair comment provided
only a qualified privilege, while many courts read Gertz as providing absolute pro-
tection. See, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 883 (1986). States also used varying formulations of fair comment, causing
great uncertainty about when a statement could be subject to suit in a number of
jurisdictions. See id. In turn, the courts and the drafters of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts "latched onto [Gertz] as the seed for a new, constitutional protection for
opinion." SACK & BARON, supra note 14, § 1.8, at 49.
16. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
17. Judge Bork filed a concurring opinion, joined by Judges Vilkey, Ginsburg, and
MacKinnon. Id. at 993 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge MacKinnon filed a concurring
opinion. Id. at 1010 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Chief Judge Robinson filed an opin-
ion dissenting in part, joined by Judge J. Skelly Wright. Id. at 1016 (Robinson, C.J.,
dissenting in part). Judge Wald filed an opinion dissenting in part, joined by Judges
Harry T. Edwards and Antonin Scalia. Id. at 1032 (Wald, J., dissenting in part).
Judge Edwards filed a statement concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at
1035 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Scalia also filed
an opinion dissenting in part, joined by Judges Wald and Edwards. Id. at 1036
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part). Some of the court's frustration with the knotty issues
raised by the factlopinion issue was revealed in questioning from the bench during
oral argument. Judge Edwards observed, "[wihen you read the cases, they are a
mess." SANFORD, supra note 15, § 5.1, at 133.
18. Olman, 750 F.2d at 979-84.
19. Id. at 979-81.
20. Id. at 981-82.
21. Id. at 982-83.
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thing other than statements of fact?' Judge Starr concluded:
[m]ost fundamentally, we are reminded that in the accommo-
dation of the conflicting concerns reflected in the First
Amendment and the law of defamation, the deep-seated con-
stitutional values embodied in the Bill of Rights require that
we not engage, without bearing clearly in mind the context
before us, in a Talmudic parsing of a single sentence or two,
as if we were occupied with a philosophical enterprise or
linguistic analysis. Ours is a practical task, with elemental
constitutional values of freedom looming large as we go about
our work. And in that undertaking, we are reminded by Gertz
itself of our duty "to assure to the freedoms of speech and press
that 'breathing space' essential to their fruitful exercise.'"
The United States Supreme Court did not squarely face
whether the Constitution provided special protection to state-
ments of opinion until 1990.24 In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co.,' a high school wrestling coach claimed that he had been
libeled by an allegation in a sports column that he lied when
testifying about his role in an altercation between his team and
an opposing squad.26 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
22. Id. at 983-84.
23. Id. at 991 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974)).
Courts adopted two other fact/opinion tests, one from Information Control Corp. v.
Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980), the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" approach, and the other from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
606-610 (1977), the "verifiability" approach.
24. The Court had addressed the fact/opinion distinction obliquely in three earlier
decisions. In Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), the
Court held that an accusation at a city council meeting that the plaintiffs negoti-
ating strategy with the city was "blackmail" was not actionable because the state-
ment was "no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who
considered Bresler's negotiating position extremely unreasonable." Id. at 14. In Old
Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264 (1974), a local union published a newsletter maligning non-union members
of a bargaining unit as "scabs" and "traitors." Id. at 268. The Court held that these
words were used in a 'loose, figurative sense," and thus were not actionable. Id. at
284. Finally, in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the Court
held that the First Amendment precluded recovery under state law for an "ad paro-
dy" that could not reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about the plain-
tiff, Reverend Jerry Falwell. Id. at 57.
25. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
26. Id. at 4-7.
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Court, rejected the proposition that the Gertz dictum "was in-
tended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for [any
statement] that might be labeled 'opinion."'27 Rather, he argued
that "such an interpretation... would... ignore the fact that
expressions of 'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective
fact." The Chief Justice asserted that for constitutional pur-
poses the relevant distinction was between a protected "subjec-
tive assertion" and an actionable "articulation of an objectively
verifiable event."29 Thus, "a statement of opinion relating to
matters of public concern which does not contain a provably
false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protec-
tion."3 In a swipe at Olman, the Chief Justice criticized reli-
ance upon "a number of factors developed by the lower courts (in
what we hold was a mistaken reliance on the Gertz dictum). '31
On the facts presented, the Chief Justice concluded that an
allegation that plaintiff Milkovich lied under oath was sufficient-
ly factual to be provable as true or false, and that the actual
words in the column were "not the sort of loose, figurative, or
hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that the
writer was seriously maintaining that petitioner committed the
crime of perjury. Nor does the general tone of the article negate
this impression. 32
27. Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 22 (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (Ohio 1986)).
30. Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 19. The Chief Justice emphasized that absolute protection remained for
statements that cannot "reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts" and that
"[tihis provides assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of 'imaginative
expression' or 'rhetorical hyperbole.'" Id. at 20 (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 53-55 (1988)). The Chief Justice also cataloged the existing
constitutional protections afforded libel defendants and concluded that they provided
sufficient protection "without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion'
and fact." Id. at 19; see also Logan, supra note 10, at 505-15 (discussing the various
constitutional protections afforded defendants in defamation actions).
32. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. One should note that Chief Justice Burger and
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist dissented from the denial of certiorari in Ollman v.
Evans, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985), on the ground that the opinion doctrine should be
limited to statements on political ideas. Id. at 1129 (Rehnquist, J., with whom Bur-
ger, C.J., joined, dissenting); see also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1002 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring) (stating that courts should be especially protec-
tive when the allegedly defamatory statements occur in the "political arena"), cert.
166 [Vol. 37:161
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Despite the common sense notion that the context in which a
statement occurs is relevant, if not essential, to understanding
the meaning of that statement, the Chief Justice's opinion fo-
cused only upon verifiability.'s So understood, Milkovich made
the "already complex body of law surrounding the fact/opinion
distinction... significantly more enigmatic."34 It also exposed
"to new libel risk editorials, reviews, commentaries, and col-
umns-areas widely thought to enjoy near-absolute protection
under the First Amendment. "
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion joined by Justice Marshall, wrote that
the Milkovich majority had answered the question of whether there is a separate
constitutional privilege for statements of opinion "cogently and almost entirely cor-
rectly." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 23 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Unlike the majority,
however, he cited Ollman and urged that context continue to be a key factor in
determining whether the offending statement purports to state or imply 'actual facts
about an individual." Id. at 24. How Justice Brennan could claim to agree with the
majority's analysis, while emphasizing the need for consideration of context, was
puzzling:
Justice Brennan's opinion was something of a feat of legerdemain.
The three cases he citedL, Ollman plus two others,] were widely acknowl-
edged for the principle that "opinion" was ipso facto constitutionally pro-
tected-precisely the point that the Court in Milkovich denied-and for
proffering tests to distinguish between unprotected allegations of fact and
protected statements of opinion. Justice Brennan's opinion transmuted
these cases from authority on the no-longer-viable issue of how to tell the
difference between unprotected fact and protected opinion, to authority for
how to tell the difference, under Milkovich, between unprotected state-
ments provably false and protected statements not provably false.
SACK & BARON, supra note 14, § 4.2.4.1, at 213 n.52 (citation omitted).
33. Cf. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 NE.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1991) (criticizing
the majority opinion in Milkovich for focusing only on the "type" of speech and
whether the words were verifiable, while ignoring the other two Ollman factors-the
presence of any qualifying language and the context in which the statement oc-
curred); Martin F. Hansen, Fact, Opinion, and Consensus: The Verifiability of Alleg-
edly Defamatory Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 43, 56-57 (1993) (same).
34. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.0112], at 6-4.1 (1994). Leading
media lawyer and treatise writer Bruce Sanford, see supra note 15, agreed, he said
that Milkovich was "'a crude opinion that destabilized an area of law that was per-
fectly stable and quite understandable" Cynthia Fox, How Scary Is Milkovich? A
Matter of Opinion, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June 1992, at 19, 20 (quoting
Bruce Sanford).
35. Fox, supra note 34, at 19. Milkovich even had an impact on federal circuit
judge (and part-time wag) Alex Kozinski. He related that he was preparing a col-
umn for the Wall Street Journal and planned to write some unpleasant things about
Nintendo:
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III. THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT
A. The Battle Lines Are Drawn: Dan Moldea and the New York
Times
Dan Moldea, a burly ex-teamster from Akron, Ohio, was an
investigative journalist "who specialize[d] in organized-crime
investigations."36 He was a successful lecturer and the author
of three books and numerous magazine and newspaper arti-
cles.37 In July 1987, "Moldea secured an assignment from
Regardie's magazine.., to write an article about [the relation-
ship between organized crime and] the National Football League
('the NFL')."3 This article led to a book, Interference: How Or-
ganized Crime Influences Professional Football (Interference).9
Moldea's thesis was that gambling and organized crime interests
had changed the outcome of as many as seventy NFL games. °
Both Moldea and his publisher had high hopes for Interfer-
ence, and Moldea embarked upon a thirteen-city promotional
tour, involving seventy interviews with the media.4 Sales of
the first printing were strong and promised to get even better
with the interest likely to be generated by the opening of the
I wanted to tweak their nose. I was about to send it out and a word
flashed through my mind: Milkovich. So I called all my law clerks to-
gether and said, "Milkovich this for me!" And sure enough, they went
through it and what had been a hard-hitting, somewhat bombastic col-
un-they're a big company, I felt they could take it-now had the
punch squeezed out of it.
Id.
36. Edwin Diamond, Can You Prove the Hollandaise Was Curdled? The Legal
Uproar Over a Times Critic, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 18, 1994, at 32, 34. Moldea was also a
long-time activist for authors' rights and founder of what became the National
Writers' Union. Doug Ireland, Personal Foul, Roughing the Writer, VILLAGE VOICE,
Sept. 11, 1990, at 8.
37. Appeal from Final Judgment of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Brief of Appellant, Dan E. Moldea at 5, Moldea v. New York
Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir.) (Moldea 1) (No. 92-7065), rev'd, 22 F.3d 310
(D.C. Cir.) (Moldea II), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994) [hereinafter Moldea Brief]
(copy on file with author).
38. Id.
39. DAN E. MOLDEA, INTERFERENCE: How ORGANIZED CRIME INFLUENCES PROFES-
SIONAL FOOTBALL (1989); see Moldea Brief, supra note 37, at 5.
40. See MOLDEA, supra note 39.
41. Moldea Brief, supra note 37, at 7.
168 [Vol. 37:161
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NFL regular season."
Consistent with the usual practice, Moldea authorized his
publisher to send a pre-publication copy of Interference to the
New York Times, in hope of having it reviewed.43 The Times
decided to review the book and assigned it to Gerald Eskenazi,
an experienced reporter who had covered the NFL for the Times
for two decades."
The resulting review in the September 3, 1989, New York
Times Sunday Book Review was extremely negative; the presti-
gious Columbia Journalism Review characterized Eskenazi's
effort as "relentlessly disparaging."45 Eskenazi asserted that
Interference contained "too much sloppy journalism"; that there
were "question[s] [about Moldea's] diligence at simple fact-check-
ing"; that Moldea's "naivet [wals apparent, as [wals his igno-
rance of basic sports knowledge"; and that he "blunted his own
sword of truth."6
Eskenazi gave several examples in support of his conclusions.
First, Eskenazi said that, in Interference, Moldea characterized a
meeting between opposing players Joe Namath and Lou
Michaels on the eve of Super Bowl III as "sinister," when in fact
the encounter was benign.4" Second, he claimed that Interfer-
ence "revive[d] the discredited notion" that the owner of the Los
Angeles Rams, Carroll Rosenbloom, met "foul play" when he
drowned in Florida.48 Third, he attacked Moldea for claiming
that point spread considerations caused the Baltimore Colts to
go for a touchdown and not a field goal in a key playoff game.49
Finally, Eskenazi maintained that Interference contained
"warmed over" information. °
42. Id.
43. Id. at 8.
44. Id.
45. Christopher Hanson, Playing "Chicken" with the First Amendment, 33 COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., May/June 1994, at 21.
46. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1151-52 (D.C. Cir.) (Moldea 1),
rev'd, 22 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994).
47. Id. at 1152.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1151. Moldea's complaint alleged that the review contained several other
false and defamatory statements, but they were not considered significant by the
1995]
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It is important to recognize that the New York Times is not
just another newspaper,51 and especially that the Sunday Book
Review section is not just another Sunday supplement. It is
available with the Sunday edition of the Times, and also by
separate subscription, with a total circulation of 1.8 million. 2 It
is immensely influential.53 As one observer pointedly comment-
ed, "[t]he plain fact is that for an American writer, there is no
worse place to take a hit than the Sunday pages of the New
York Times. The second-worst place is the New York Times of
any day that isn't Sunday, and the third-worst place doesn't
really matter much in terms of how a book does on the mar-
ket."54 This is because booksellers use the Review as a guide to
choosing which books to buy and promote.5
Moldea alleged that the impact on Interference and his career
was "swift and devastating."5 ' In a matter of weeks, his pub-
lisher withdrew its support, twelve thousand copies were re-
turned to the publisher, reviews and articles about the book
virtually ceased, and invitations for Moldea to appear on radio
and television evaporated. 7 The prospects for a second and
third edition and a paperback deal died.' In short, Eskenazi's
courts. See id. at 1141-42.
51. The New York Times Company is a Fortune 500 company (number 464 in
sales in 1993). FORBES, Apr. 25, 1994, at 284.
52. Moldea Brief, supra note 37, at 7.
53. Libel Suit; Critics and Their Targets, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Oct. 15,
1994, at A14 [hereinafter Libel Suit].
54. Pete Drexler, Keep Art Criticism Out of Lawyers' Hands, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Feb. 28, 1994, at A2.
55. JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, FIT TO PRINT: A.M. ROSENTHAL AND HIS TIMEs 18
(1988); see also SACK & BARON, supra note 14, § 4.1, at 201 ("[A] spiteful review in
the New York Times Book Review can hurt the reputation of both the reviewed work
and its author."). The Book Review is especially important to chain bookstores, which
represent an increasingly large percentage of sales. See Edwin Diamond, The Last
Word: Behind the Mystique of the New York Times Book Review, N.Y. MAG., Jan. 10,
1994, at 28, 30; Roger C. Simmons, In Reviews, Facts Matter, NEWSDAY, Mar. 18,
1994, at 60. More generally, "since the demise of the New York Herald Tribune, [the
Times has become the] putative authority as America's elite newspaper of culture."
Carlin Romano, Paper Chase-I, NATION, June 6, 1994, at 778, 784.
56. Moldea Brief, supra note 37, at 12 (detailing the adverse impact upon sales of
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review "utterly destroyed Moldea's reputation as an investiga-
tive journalist... with the resultant effect that Moldea c[ould]
no longer earn a living as a writer."59
Moldea believed that Eskenazi misrepresented Interference by
asserting that it contained false allegations and omitted essen-
tial information. Immediately after the review was published,
Moldea wrote to Eskenazi and the Times to complain."° Moldea
also charged that Eskenazi had a conflict of interest that should
have precluded his being assigned to review Interference. In
Moldea's view, Eskenazi had a long and mutually supportive
relationship with the NFL that disposed him to defend the NFL
by attacking a highly critical book.6' Eskenazi had long been
dependent on NFL sources for their goodwill in providing infor-
mation on the league's activities." Eskenazi also may have had
a preexisting relationship with the NFL Director of Communica-
tions.63 Moldea was especially troubled because the Review did
not reveal Eskenazi's relationship with the NFL.' Instead, the
Times provided a misleading credit line that cited only
Eskenazi's ongoing work on a biography of baseball star Carl
Yastrzemski.65 According 'to Moldea, Eskenazi's assignment vio-
lated the Times's well-established policy against knowingly as-
signing reviewers who have close ties with anyone who is promi-
nently mentioned in the book under review.66
59. Id. Moldea claimed that having the audacity to sue the Times damaged his
career even further. After filing suit in August 1990, he "turned in 20 proposals on
11 different subjects .... No one want[ed] to work with [him] because [he] took on
the Times.'" David Streitfeld, Libel Suit on Book Review Reinstated, WASH. POST,
Feb. 19, 1994, at G1, G2 (quoting Moldea).
60. Moldea contacted the Tines because under libel law it was a "primary pub-
lisher," legally responsible for any libels that appear in its pages. SMOLLA, supra
note 34, § 4.13[3].
61. Moldea Brief, supra note 37, at 9.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id. at 8-9.
66. Id. at 8; accord Diamond, supra note 55, at 28. Eskenazi purported to address
the conflict of interest issue in the first paragraph of his review:
First, rve got to admit a tangled financial connection to the National
Football League. My wife's first cousin married a psychiatrist whose
father sold his plumbing business to a company that eventually became
Warner Communications. And the owners of several football teams have
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On September 7, 1989, four days after the publication of the
review, Moldea wrote to Eskenazi, sending a copy to the editor
of the Book Review, asking for a retraction or correction.17 An
attorney for the Times responded by letter, stating that
Eskenazi had no conflict of interest and that the review was
"clearly protected as opinion, and there is no basis for a retrac-
tion or correction."' Subsequently, Moldea wrote to the Times,
requesting that it print a letter to the editor that refuted
Eskenazi's allegations; he did not receive a reply.69 Because he
had failed at every turn to get his side of the story out,70
Moldea filed suit against the Times on August 23, 1990,71 argu-
ing that under Milkovich, reviewers should be held to the same
standards of accuracy as news reporters. He further alleged that
Eskenazi's critical statements were actionable because they
could be proven false, were highly defamatory, and were made
with reckless disregard for the truth.72
Taking up the cudgels against a deep pocket media giant is
neither cheap nor easy;73 Moldea lacked the funds necessary to
a piece of Warner. Is that clear?
Moldea v. New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1151 (D.C. Cir.) (Moldea 1), rev'd, 22
F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994). One commentator concluded
that "Eskenazi's condescension and deception, coupled with his alleged inaccuracies,
[understandably] infuriated Moldea." Romano, supra note 55, at 778.
67. Moldea Brief, supra note 37, at 11.
68. Id.
69. Id. Moldea argued that the Times usually printed letters from authors whose
books received unfavorable reviews as a matter of "customary courtesy." Id.; accord
John Leonard, Revenge of the Fettucini, NATION, July 11, 1994, at 59 (relating that
the Times published a full-page letter from Henry Kissinger defending his book Di-
plomacy, but refused to do so for Moldea, who was in comparison a mere "street
vendor"). George Freeman, an attorney for the Times, later denied that Moldea's let-
ter was ever received, adding that "[e]yen if there was such a letter, even in his
scenario, it was three months late, addressed niggling issues in the review and es-
sentially had the same problems as his whole case did." Debra G. Hernandez, New
York Times Prevails in Libel Case, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Oct. 15, 1994, at 20.
70. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974) ("[The law of
defamation is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie.").
71. Moldea Brief, supra note 37, at 3. Moldea also considered suing the Washing-
ton Post for its unfavorable review of Interference, but decided against it after the
paper printed his letter to the editor. David Streitfeld, Author Sues Over Negative
Review, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1990, at C1.
72. See Moldea Brief, supra note 37, at 15.
73. One astute observer has written:
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retain counsel at an hourly rate or even a flat fee." Indeed,
until the Court handed down Milkovich in late June 1990, all
the lawyers that Moldea contacted refused to take his case be-
cause Gertz and its progeny provided absolute protection for
commentary in reviews."5 Armed with Milkovich and five thou-
sand dollars up front, however, Moldea retained on a contingen-
cy basis Roger C. Simmons, one of two partners in a six-person
general practice firm in Frederick, Maryland."6
The Times was represented by its in-house counsel, George
Freeman, and three attorneys from the Washington, D.C., office
of Baker & Hostetler." Lead counsel -was Bruce W. Sanford,
the author of a leading libel law treatise."8 The Times success-
[A] plaintiffs ability to pursue [a libel] claim depends on a lawyer's
willingness to take the case on a contingent fee. Most lawyers see media
defendants as tenacious, well-represented litigants whose insurors gen-
erally will honor the defendant's reluctance to settle. The prospective
recovery must be large enough to justify the lawyer's investment of time.
in a protracted and expensive lawsuit that may produce no recovery at
all.
David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 502-03
(1991).
74. See Michael Richman, The Man Who Would Smite the New York Times, WASH.
TIMES, May 9, 1994, at C10, ClI (stating that Mr. Simmons, Moldea's attorney,
accepted the case on a contingency basis with a $5,000 retainer); David Streitfeld,
Moldea Appeal Rejected, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1994, at E2 (stating that Moldea's
"income from publishing under his own name and lecturing plunged from $59,000 in
1988 to $2,800 in 1991").
75. Howard Fields, Author Charges Libel in 2V.Y. Times' Book Review, PUBUISHERS
WKLY., Sept. 7, 1990, at 10.
76. See Richman, supra note 74, at Cli. At trial and on appeal, Simmons was
assisted by an associate at his firm and Stephen M. Trattner of Lewis & Trattner,
id., a four-person firm in Washington, D.C. See 4 MARTINDALE-HIUBBELL LAW DIREC-
TORY DC591B (1995). Trattner had an intellectual property practice. Id.
77. Baker & Hostetler is the 25th largest firm in the country with 75 of its al-
most 400 attorneys in the D.C. office. The NMJ 250, NATL L.J., Oct. 3, 1994, at C1,
C8.
78. SANFORD, supra note 15. Sanford is chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression at the University of
Virginia, has headed various American Bar Association committees, and has submit-
ted twenty briefs to the United States Supreme Court, mostly on behalf of amici in
First Amendment cases. Indeed, Sanford cited to his own treatise in his appellate
brief in Moldea. See Brief of Appellee The New York Times Co. at 13, Moldea v.
New York Times Co, 15 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 92-7065) (Moldea 1), rev'd, 22
F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994) [hereinafter New York Times
Initial Briefi] (copy on file with author).
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fully moved to stay discovery and to deny Moldea's motion to
amend the complaint.79 On January 31, 1992, District Judge
John Garrett Penn granted the Times's summary judgment mo-
tion on the grounds that Eskenazi's review "exemplifies a de-
scription of a literary work, from one's personal perspective.""°
B. Moldea I: A Bridge Too Far?
The parties argued Moldea v. New York Times Co.81 in the
District of Columbia Circuit on September 14, 1993. The situa-
tion must have looked good to the Times; the panel consisted of
Chief Judge Abner Mikva and Judges Patricia Wald and Harry
T. Edwards, the remaining Democratic appointees on a court
that had otherwise been recast into a conservative bench by
Ronald Reagan and George Bush. 2
The Times was wrong to be optimistic-dead wrong. In a two-
to-one decision, the court reversed and remanded for trial on the
merits.83 Judge Edwards, for himself and Judge Wald, began by
reviewing Milkovich and then turned to the question of whether
Eskenazi's review reasonably could be understood to imply prov-
able facts. 4 Eskenazi's allegation that Interference contained
"too much sloppy journalism" was capable of a defamatory mean-
ing, the judge reasoned, because "it reasonably can be under-
stood to rest on provable, albeit unstated, defamatory facts," and
because it was "inescapable that Eskenazi implies certain
79. Moldea Brief, supra note 37, at 3-4.
80. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 793 F. Supp. 335, 337 (D.D.C. 1992), aftd, 15
F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202
(1994).
81. 15 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
202 (1994).
82. Michael Hedges, A Long-Shot Liberal Sweep: 3 Key Cases, Same 3 Judges,
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1993, at Al. According to D.C. Circuit officials, panels are
chosen at random by computer. As it turned out, the liberal troika was assigned
Moldea and the two other most critical constitutional law cases to come before the
D.C. Circuit that year. The odds of this occurring were said to be more than
4,492,125 to 1, greater than the chance of getting hit by lightning or winning a
lottery. Id. at A19. Upon closer inspection, the attitude of the liberals on libel issues
was uncertain; Judges Wald and Edwards both dissented in part in Olman v. Ev-
ans. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
83. Moldea I, 15 F.3d at 1151.
84. Id. at 1143-50.
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facts-that Moldea plays fast and loose with his sources, that
his allegations are not to be believed."' Acknowledging that
"too much sloppy journalism" was difficult to quantify "in a vac-
uum," Judge Edwards nevertheless concluded that the phrase
had "obvious, measurable aspects when applied to the field of
investigative journalism." 6 In Judge Edwards's view, Eskenazi
attacked the "discrete and fact-bound efforts of an investigative
journalist," not some "amorphous, value-laden respect such as
writing style."
87
The court agreed with Moldea's argument that the analysis
should "not [be] altered by the fact that the challenged state-
ments appeared in a 'book review' rather than in a hard news
story."'s The court was unwilling to "craft a rule that permitted
otherwise libelous statements to go unchecked as long as they
appeared in sacrosanct genres." 9 This conclusion was support-
ed by Milkovich, in which the Supreme Court found statements
actionable even though they appeared in an opinion column in a
newspaper sports section, "a forum well known for spirited ex-
pressions of personal opinion."
90
For the Times to be entitled to summary judgment, it had to
prove that the review contained facts supporting Eskenazi's
judgment that Moldea was guilty of "sloppy journalism." Accord-
ing to the court, the Times failed to support two of the state-
ments in the review. First, Eskenazi's review charged that Inter-
ference characterized a meeting on the eve of Super Bowl III as
"sinister."9' Moldea argued that the book maintained the oppo-
site, that the meeting was innocent.92 To Judge Edwards, this
was "an essentially factual claim-either Interference so de-
scribes the meeting or it does not." 3 The court was unwilling to
85. Id. at 1145.
86. Id. Judge Edwards drew an analogy: "Similarly, an accusation of 'clumsy
hands' may be amorphous in and of itself, but reasonable listeners would agree as
to its implications when applied to a brain surgeon." Id.
87. Id. at 1145 n.6.
88. Id. at 1145.46.
89. Id. at 1146.
90. Id. (citing Mlkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 9 (1990)).
91. Id. at 1152.
92. Id. at 1147.
93. Id. at 1146-47. Judge Edwards considered the Times's efforts, both in brief
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conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable juror would neces-
sarily find Eskenazi's statement to be true, so summary judg-
ment for the Times on the "sinister" issue was inappropriate.94
The court reached the same conclusion on Eskenazi's allega-
tion that Moldea "revive[d] the discredited notion" that Carroll
Rosenbloom died because of foul play.95 At one point in Interfer-
ence, Moldea did mention that Rosenbloom's friends speculated
that the Mob had killed Rosenbloom.96 Some forty pages later,
however, Moldea discussed his own research, setting out his
conclusion that "the evidence appears to be clear that
Rosenbloom died in a tragic accident and was not murdered." 7
The Times asserted that because Moldea had mentioned the
rumor, he, albeit briefly, had "revived" it. 8 The court disagreed
and concluded that a reasonable jury could find for Moldea,
taking into consideration the "generally negative tone of the re-
view as a whole," because Eskenazi's statement implied that
Moldea "intentionally purvey[ed] 'discredited notions' in an effort
to suggest scandal where there [was] none.'
In dissent, Chief Judge Mikva agreed with the Times's argu-
ments: "too much sloppy journalism" was not a verifiable state-
ment; 0 Eskenazi's allegation that the pre-Super Bowl meeting
was "sinister" was not verifiable because Eskenazi merely ex-
and oral argument, to prove that the disputed passages in Interference in fact de-
scribed a "sinister" meeting, made it "clear that one can adduce evidence on the
issue and that a jury could meaningfully decide it." Id.
94. Id. at 1147.
95. Id. at 114748.
96. Id. at 1147.
97. Id. at 114748.
98. Id. at 1152.
99. Id. at 1148.
100. Id. at 1153 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). According to Chief Judge Mikva, the
statement "too sloppy," in the context of a book review, was the equivalent of saying
that the author wrote a "bad" book. The statement was not actionable because it
represented an unverifiable evaluation of the author's "writing style or research
methods." Id. at 1154-55. One should note that Eskenazi's review was directed at
Moldea's research in support of a nonfiction book, not at his style; the notion of
"style" is much more subjective and therefore essentially unverifiable. Compare THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1785 (3d ed. 1992)
(defining "style" as "the combination of distinctive features of -literary or artistic
expression") with id. at 1534 (defining "research" as "scholarly or scientific investiga-
tion or inquiry").
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pressed his opinion that Moldea gave readers a false impression
of the meeting;'' and the Rosenbloom allegation was "either
supported by reference to the book" or was a "non-verifiable
opinion." " Overarching these specific conclusions, Chief Judge
Mikva insisted on drawing a "sharp distinction between commu-
nications intended to inform and those seeking to appeal to the
artistic senses."0 3 Failing to maintain this distinction would
make such a defamation suit "the arbiter of... literary and
artistic tastes.""4 Rather, determination of "the 'sloppiness' of
the reviewer's work should be left to the readers to determine,
rather than for judges or juries to ordain."'0 5
C. Counterattack
The D.C. Circuit's decision to remand the case for trial hit like
a bombshell. The Times and its media allies quickly mounted a
four-pronged counterattack.
First, the Times and its allies in the media took what had
been a relatively little-noticed appellate decision and turned it
into a cause c6l~bre. °6 Moldea I was termed "chilling,"1 07
"alarming,"0 8 and a "bummer."0 9 The Times's counsel, Bruce
101. Moldea , 15 F.3d at 1156-57 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1157. According to Chief Judge Mikva, if "revive" is defined as "discuss
anew," then Eskenazi was truthful: Moldea did "discuss anew" the rumors about
Rosenbloom's death. Id. If "revived" implied that Moldea actually subscribed to the
rumors, the conclusion was, like the "sinister" characterization, "based not on prov-
able facts but on a non-verifiable interpretation of one reviewer." Id.
103. Id. at 1152.
104. Id. at 1153. Judge Mikva admitted that book reviewing was not as "clearly
subjective" as other forms of artistic criticism, but insisted that the standard of
"sloppiness" in the book review context was not verifiable. Id.
105. Id. at 1158 (emphasis added).
106. Before Moldea I, the case was mentioned only six times in the Curnws file of
the NEXIS database, and only three of these references entailed more than one sen-
tence. Search of LEXIS, News library, Curnws file (May 4, 1995). After Moldea I,
the case was mentioned 53 times before the court handed down Moldea ff. Id.
107. A Million for Your Thoughts, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 18, 1994, at 12; see also
Joann Byrd, A Little Chilly in Here, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1994, at C6 (decrying the
"chilling effect of laws declaring that opinion pieces are not immune to libel suits").
108. James J. Kilpatrick, Alarming Opinion Shakes Foundations of the First
Amendment, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 23, 1994, at 3.
109. Jonathan Yardley, Reviewing a Bad Decision, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1994, at
B2.
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Sanford, said that the decision was "aberrational," ignoring
"centuries of jurisprudence."" o Sarah Lyall wrote in a Times
article that Moldea I "shocked and frightened newspaper and
magazine lawyers around the country," and that there was great
fear that it could be "extrapolated to apply to reviews not only of
books but also of films, art and restaurants.""' The Washing-
ton Post warned of an inevitable slide down the slippery slope:
"What the courts decide in author Dan E. Moldea's lawsuit and
in similar cases could also apply to movie reviews and arts re-
views and letters to the editor. And those affect... the whole
public discussion." ' George Freeman, in-house counsel for the
Times, warned that "'a reviewer who suggests the Mona Lisa is
frowning and not smiling [may now] be the victim of a libel suit'
if someone disagrees." The editor of the Washington Post book
review section wrote. that Moldea I could lead reviewers to "fold
[their] tents."" Henry R. Kaufman, chief counsel of the Libel
Defense Resource Center, termed Judge Edwards's opinion "a
surprising if not startling result, and perhaps unprecedented."" 5
The Columbia Journalism Review claimed Moldea I sent an
"arctic tingle down the spines of many opinion writers.""6 Li-
bel law expert Rodney Smolla claimed that Moldea I declared
"'open season on reviewers who make candid, acerbic com-
ments.""' 7 Judges Edwards and Wald came under intense criti-
cism:"' Moldea I was "bizarre"1 9 and "could destroy an
110. Saundra Torry, Full-Court Press, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1994, (Washington Busi-
ness), at F7.
111. Sarah Lyall, Book Notes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1994, at 019.
112. Byrd, supra note 107, at C6.
113. Debra G. Hernandez, $10 Million Lawsuit Against N.Y. Times Revived on Ap-
peal, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Mar. 19, 1994, at 28, 29 (quoting George Freeman, the
New York Times's senior attorney).
114. Yardley, supra note 109, at B2; see also A Suit Over 'Sloppy,' WASH. POST,
Feb. 24, 1994, at A26 (stating that Moldea I "greatly impairs the ability of opinion
writers to speak their minds").
115. Streitfeld, supra note 71, at G1.
116. Hanson, supra note 45, at 21; see also Hugh Davies, Critics Free To Criticise,
Say Judges, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 5, 1994, at 7 (reporting that Moldea I "caused
panic in the book world").
117. David G. Savage, Libel Suit Is Reinstated for Book Review in N.Y. Times, LA.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1994, at A18.
118. David G. Savage, U.S. Court Rewrites Its Chapter on Harsh Book Reviews,
L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1994, at A22.
119. Martin Garbus, Law Review: It's OK To Criticize As Long As It's Positive,
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American art form-the review."' 20 One commentator even sug-
gested that the decision foreshadowed a regime of state licensing
of critics.'" Columnist James J. Kilpatrick argued that be-
cause of Moldea 1, "every columnist and editorial writer in the
country... will now Want to think twice about expressing opin-
ions"; indeed, Kilpatrick asserted, it was "something for every
critic to think about. I'm thinking hard about what I myself
write about fatheaded federal judges."' =
The award for the most purple prose, however, goes to Edwin
Diamond, who wrote:
Every author, artist, or chef out to avenge an ego wounded by
a less-than-glowing review is now a potential plaintiff with a
viable lawsuit.... The spectacle of, say, a sous-chefs subpoe-
naing a restaurant critic's notes or a music reviewer facing a
voir dire in a case brought by a string quartet is
daunting.... Litigious chaos would rule in place of robust
free expression.
123
The second aspect of the Times counterattack was to line up
powerful allies to file amicus briefs. Siding with the Times were
the Associated Press, Scripps-Howard, Dow Jones & Co., The
Christian Science Monitor, U.S. News & World Report, Time,
Inc., The New Yorker Magazine, the Copley Press, Inc., the
Newsletter Publishers Association, the Newspaper Association of
DAILY VARIETY, Apr. 11, 1994, at 19. In a less apocalyptic mode, Garbus criticized
the majority for thinking that its analysis provided "subtle distinctions [that] have
some clarity," when it did not. Martin Garbus, My Mother, Book Reviews, and the
First Amendment, LEGAL TIMEs, Mar. 14, 1994, at 19, 22.
120. Lucy Dalglish, Who Are They To Criticize? They're Critics, That's Who, QUILL,
May, 1994, at 14. Dalglish is a bit historically challenged if she believes that re-
viewihg is a particularly "American art form." See generally 2 J.W.H. ATKINS, LITER-
ARY CRITIcISM IN ANTIQUITY: A SKETCH OF ITS DEVELOPMENT (1934) (tracing develop-
ment of Graeco-Roman criticism in the first century B.C.).
121. Leonard, supra note 69, at 59 (discussing the 1988 bill introduced in the Con-
necticut legislature that required restaurant critics to have spent at least six years
in the "food service industry" or to have graduated from a "recognized culinary arts
program").
122. Kilpatrick, supra note 108, at 3:
123. Diamond, supra note 36, at 32 (citation omitted). Indeed, the press coverage of
Moldea I raised the specter that "no reviewer in the land would be safe from a
lawsuit and Western Civilization itself might be in danger." Streitfeld, supra note
74, at E2.
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America, the Magazine Publishers of America, the Society of
Professional Journalists,124 the Association of American Pub-
lishers, and the PEN American Center.1" Upon reviewing the
forces arrayed on his side, Times counsel George Freeman exult-
ed: "[i]t's very significant that even the book publishers and
authors who are the subject of scathing reviews have realized
that though in the short run they may be happy that the Times
got into trouble over a book review, in the long run their inter-
ests are on the side of free speech and allowance of opinionated
reviews. ' No one filed an amicus in support of Moldea.
It is also possible to explain Moldea's lonely position in a more
sinister manner: the Times used its considerable muscle. For one
thing, the Times successfully lobbied the National Book Critics
Circle 7 to stay on the sidelines, even though some of its mem-
bers agreed with Moldea that reviewers should be accountable
for what they write."2  The Authors Guild followed suit."2
The Christian Science Monitor reported that people in the pub-
lishing industry were afraid to associate publicly with a position
that drew the wrath of the mainline media. "I wouldn't touch
this case with a 10-foot pole," said the publicity director of a
major publishing company."' The book editor of a major news-
paper said, "I have no comment because I walk a tightrope be-
124. See Motion of the Newspaper Association of America, et al., for Leave To File
Amicus Curiae at i [hereinafter Association Motion] (copy on file with author).
125. The PEN American Center is an international "organization . . . of novelists,
poets, essayists, translators, playwrights and editors." See Motion For Leave To File
Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief of Association of American Publishers, Inc., and
PEN American Center as Amici Curiae at ii [hereinafter PEN Motion arid Brief]
(copy on file with author).
126. Lyall, supra note 111, at C19.
127. The National Book Critics Circle is a trade group of book editors and
freelance critics.
128. Jack Miles, Sticks and Stones, LA. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994, (Book Review), at 11.
The president of the Critics Circle later explained this decision: "As reviewers,
[NBCC members] don't like to think that they might be subject to a lawsuit. . . .As
writers, they are aware that there is essentially no recourse and standards are so
loose that a blatant misrepresentation of facts has a good chance of getting into
print.'" Jamie Prime, Two Negatives = Court Date(s), QUIL, Oct. 1994, at 31, 32
(quoting Jack Miles).
129. Lyall, supra note 111, at 19.
130. David Holmstrom, Libel Case Over Book Reviews Troubles Publishers, CHRIS-
TIAN SC. MONITOR, Mar. 1, 1994, at 3.
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tween the needs of book publishers, advertising, and review-
ers." 3' Both insisted on anonymity. The Boston Globe editori-
alized that Moldea was so isolated because of "how spineless the
rest of the media are in the shadow of the Times [sic] .,,132
The Times's third tactic was to bolster the already strong legal
team assembled for Moldea I by putting together, with media
amici, the most powerful lineup of heavy hitters east of People v.
O.J. Simpson. One of the amici'" retained R. Bruce Rich of
Weil, Gotshal & Manges. 34 Rich was a communications law
expert, having participated in seven cases in the United States
Supreme Court." Professor Leon Friedman of Hofstra Univer-
sity Law School, an expert in constitutional law who had sub-




132. A Million for Your Thoughts, supra note 107, at 12; see also Miles, supra note
128, at 12 (stating that publishers were afraid to be on the "wrong side of a news-
paper that could do so much harm or good to their future products").
Moldea was no innocent in the world of public relations; he issued a press
release the day he filed suit. Streitfeld, supra note 71, at C1. Also, after Moldea I,
Moldea and his attorney, Simmons, were able to tell their side of the story in the
handful of publications that provided a semblance of balanced coverage of the case.
See, e.g., Roger C. Simmons, Beyond a 'Bad Review,' WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1994, at
A21; Simmons, supra note 55, at 60; see also Diamond, supra note 36, at 32 ("Al-
most all the news stories and editorial commentaries about the case have framed it
as the story of one crank writer whining about one bad review."); Debra G.
Hernandez, N.Y. Times Seeks Review of Libel Suit Reinstatement, EDrrOR & PUBLISH-
ER, Apr. 23, 1994, at 112; Miles, supra note 128, at 11. Moldea's only other un-
abashed legal champion in the media was reflexively conservative commentator
Bruce Fein. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Defamation and 'Sloppy Journalism,' LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1994, at 19, 20 (stating that Moldea I "chills what ought to be chilled");
see also David Kronke, In a Perfect World, Audiences Could Sue, LA. TIMES, Feb.
28, 1994, at F1 (explaining that Moldea I made "one person's job ... suddenly and
exponentially ... more hectic. Michael Bolton's attorney.").
133. The Association of American Publishers. See PEN Motion and Brief, supra
note 125.
134. Weil, Gotshal & Manges is a New York firm of over six hundred lawyers. See
The ILJ 250, supra note 77, at C6.
135. Id. R. Bruce Rich is the author of Book Publishing and the First Amendment
and co-author of Defamation-in-Fiction: The Limited Viability of Alternative Causes of
Action, 52 BROOK. L. REV 1 (1986), with Livia D. Brilliant: Mr. Rich was assisted by
Bernadette M. McCann Ezring.
136. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, US file (Sept. 25, 1995).
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Not to be outdone, the remaining amici13 7 retained attorneys
from the Washington, D.C., office of Kirkland & Ellis (K&E),
including lead counsel Kenneth W. Starr. 3 ' Starr had "the re-
sume of a legal wunderkind." 39 He had clerked for Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger and at age thirty-seven was appointed to the
D.C. Circuit.40 In 1989, at the request of President Bush, he
resigned his life-tenured judgeship to serve as Solicitor Gener-
al.' Press reports had Starr on the President's short list of
possible nominees for the Supreme Court vacancies created by
the retirements of Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Mar-
shall.' With the change in administrations, he joined
K&E. 4
3
Starr was a brilliant choice for the Times and its supporters.
First, he had the impeccable credentials necessary to suggest to
the court that the Times's position was mainstream; with his
reputation as a moderate conservative, the Times's insistence
that its book reviews should not be the target of libel litigation
would be considerably burnished. Perhaps even more important,
Starr was the author of the lead opinion in the D.C. Circuit's en
banc decision in Olman v. Evans,44 the leading libel decision
before Milkovich.43 Who better to speak to his former col-
leagues about the difficult questions raised by libel in the con-
text of a book review?46
137. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
138. The Washington office of K&E has 81 attorneys out of the firm's total of ap-
proximately 450. See The NLJ 250, supra note 77, at C8. Starr was assisted by two
associates, Steven Gill Bradbury, who, before joining K&E, had clerked for Judge
James L. Buckley of the D.C. Circuit and later Justice Clarence Thomas, see 4
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, supra note 76, at DC545B, and Jonathan F.
Putnam, who had clerked for Judge A. Raymond Randolph of the D.C. Circuit, 11
id. at NYC653B.
139. Steve McGonigle, Friends Consider Starr Fair-Minded, Intelligent, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 6, 1994, at 7A.
140." Id.; see 4 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, supra note 76, at DC546B.
141. See McGonigle, supra note 139, at 7A.
142. See Kim Masters, Kenneth Starr, Supernova?, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1995, at
El.
143. Id.
144. 750 F.2d 970 (1984).
145. 497 U.S. 1 (1990); see supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
146. The only possible blemishes on Starr's record occurred after Moldea II. In
August 1994, he was appointed independent counsel to investigate the financial
182 [Vol. 37:161
1995] MOLDEA V. NEW YORK TIMES 183
The final aspect of the Times counterattack was the honing of
several legal arguments made in Moldea I and the raising of an
important new one. In its initial brief on appeal, filed June 17,
1993, the Times maintained that even after Milkovich, a court
must consider the context in which the challenged statement ap-
peared.4 ' In particular, whether Interference contained "too
much sloppy journalism" could not be proven true or false be-
dealings of President Clinton, his wife, Hillary Clinton, and their friends arising out
of the Whitewater investment scheme. The appointment was criticized because of
Starr's long-time involvement in Republican politics. See Masters, supra note 142, at
E6. He had also argued publicly that Paula Jones should be able to pursue her
sexual harassment lawsuit against the President. Outcry Grows for Starr's Removal
as Whitewater Prosecutor, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 19, 1994, at 46A. Additionally,
although independent counsels (unlike federal prosecutors) are permitted to do pri-
vate legal work, Starr was criticized for continuing to receive his seven-figure K&E
salary while serving as independent counsel. Dennis Cauchon & Judy Keen, Pressure
Mounts for Whitewater's Starr To Quit, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 1994, at 6A. This
criticism flared up again when Starr filed his most recent financial disclosure form
(four months late); it revealed that he had earned $1.14 million from his private
practice while serving as independent counsel. (He graciously accepted only 75% of
his government salary, but kept all of the $25,000 offered for teaching a course at
NYU School of Law). Frank J. Murray, Starr Busy in Private Practice; Made 1.1
Million Outside Official Role, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at A4. United Airlines,
Hughes Aircraft, Amoco Oil, Phillip Morris, and Brown & Williamson Tobacco are
just a few of his nonpareil stable of clients. Id.
Another complication arose because immediately before Starr's appointment, the
chief judge of -the panel responsible for appointing independent counsels, David
Sentelle, dined with Republican U.S. Senators Lauch Faircloth and Jesse Helms. Mr.
Starr's Duty To Resign, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1994, at A22. Sentelle, formerly a
Republican party activist in North Carolina, insisted that the luncheon was simply a
meeting between "old friends" in which they discussed "cowboy boots, country music,
and prostate problems." Toni Locy, Citizen Complaint Filed Over Whitewater Appoint-
ment: Judge's Role Questioned in Whitewater Case, WASH. POSr, Sept. 31, 1994, at
A4. Others believed that the meeting suggested that Starr's appointment was the
result of partisan political pressure. Id. The New York Times editorialized that the
meeting "fatally tainted" Starr, id., while five former presidents of the American Bar
Association filed ethics complaints against Judge Sentelle, arguing that the meeting
with the senators "resulted in an appearance of impropriety" In the Matter of a
Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In
one of the many ironies surrounding Moldea v. New York Times, the ethics com-
plaints were considered and rejected in an opinion written by the author of the
Moldea opinions, Chief Judge Harry Edwards. Id. As an additional side note, in
January 1995, Senator Faircloth hired Judge Sentelle's wife as a receptionist. Sena-
tor Hired Wife of Judge On Panel that Named Whitewater Counsel, BALTIMORE SUN,
Aug. 1, 1995, at 8A.
147. New York Times Initial Brief, supra note 78, at 13-18.
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cause it represented an "unverifiable personal assessment"48
that appeared in an opinion column rather than in a hard news
column.' The Times also argued that the trial judge had de-
termined correctly that the other statements challenged by
Moldea were either factually supported by the book or intrin-
sically nonverifiable. 5 ° In support of these arguments, the
Times provided a close linguistic analysis of the words Eskenazi
used by discoursing upon how "sloppy" is "tod sloppy,"
15
'
whether an encounter was "sinister,"5 ' and that there are "no
fewer than 25 separate definitions for the word 'revive.''" 3
In its March 21, 1994, petition for rehearing, the Times re-
newed its arguments that Milkovich allowed consideration of
context and that the challenged statements were not actionable
because they appeared in a book review.14 The Times asserted
that this fundamental error led the court in Moldea I to mis-
apprehend the applicable law, with dangerous consequences. 55
First, in ruling for Moldea, the court improperly rewrote
Eskenazi's review. By equating "sloppy journalism," Eskenazi's
actual words, with an allegation of professional incompetence,
the majority "utterly transform[ed' a subjective evaluation of a
148. Id. at 18.
149. Id. at 21. In support of its position, the Times quoted a number of classic
critiques, including Dorothy Parker's evaluation of Katherine Hepburn's acting abili-
ty, "[s]he runs the gamut of emotions from A to B," id. at 21, and Mae West's riff
on how much is too much, "[t]oo much of a good thing can be wonderful," id. at 22
n.9, to show "too much" was "an inherently subjective assessment," id.
150. Id. at 23-25.
151. Id. at 22.
152. Id. at 31.
153. Id. at 32 n.14 (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 835-36 (2d ed. 1989)).
Judge Edwards used this last argument to support the conclusion in Moldea I that
Eskenazi's statements were sufficiently verifiable to justify jury consideration. Moldea
v. New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1146 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 22 F.3d 310 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994).
154. Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc of Appellee The
New York Times Co. at 5-7 [hereinafter New York Times Petition for Rehearing]
(copy on file with author). This point was also made, in much greater detail, in the
amicus petition of PEN, which discussed data from social science that "prove[d] that
readers rely upon context-page environment'-to distinguish between 'opinion' and
'fact.'" PEN Motion and Brief, supra note 125, at 10.
155. New York Times Petition for Rehearing, supra note 154, at 5-7.
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book into an accusation of journalistic malpractice.'56 Unlike
the allegation in Milkovich, that the plaintiff was a liar, an
evaluation of the qualities of a book was not verifiable by refer-
ence to any "specific events."157
Second, the Times argued that in artistic criticism there is no
"true" conclusion, and that book reviews necessarily involve 'liter-
ary interpretation," an "intensely subjective" enterprise.5 ' The
"fundamental error" of Moldea I was thus "not in concluding that
Eskenazi's characterization [of Interference] was arguably wrong; it
[wals in presuming that there [wals any right interpretation.''59
Third, counsel for the Times vividly described the untoward
consequences that would result if Moldea I was allowed to
stand. There would be a "proliferation of lawsuits and protracted
discovery by disappointed authors, artists, and performers." 6 '
Moldea I would allow any libel plaintiff to withstand summary
judgment if "any verifiable factual assertion can be extracted
from inherently subjective interpretations of vague terms, liter-
ary passages, or historical perspectives." 6' This result, in turn,
would inflict catastrophic injury upon the First Amendment and
the commitment to "robust debate" that it embodies'62 because
156. Id. at 9-10.
157. Id. at 10; see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) ("A deter-
mination whether petitioner lied in this instance can be made on a core of objective
evidence by comparing, inter clia, petitioner's testimony before the OHSAA board
with his subsequent testimony before the trial court."). In its initial brief, the Times
did refer obliquely to the "rewriting" argument, but not with regard to the essence
of Moldea's claim that the review portrayed him as "incompetent or dishonest." See
New York Times Initial Brief, supra note 78, at 29-30 (arguing that Eskenazi had
not suggested that the pre-Super Bowl meeting between Namath and Michaels was
"premeditated," as Moldea charged in his complaint).
158. New York Times Petition for Rehearing, supra note 154, at 12, (quoting
Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 918 (Wyo. 1992)) ("[W]hen dealing with inter-
pretation of a literary work, [courts] must be especially careful to guard the critic's
right to express his opinion about the meaning of the work.").
159. Id. at 12. This theme was elaborated by amici. See PEN Motion and Brief,
supra note 125, at 14 ("Inhere cannot be one 'true' meaning within the genre of
literary criticism.").
160. New York Times Petition for Rehearing, supra note 154, at 1.
161. Id. at 13.
162. See id. at 1. This argument was developed more extensively in the PEN Brief
and the Association Motion. The PEN brief contended that Moldea I "invite[d] each
of the hundreds, if not thousands, of persons criticized in the thousands of book re-
views . . . to bring libel actions against their critics," PEN Motion and Brief, supra
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Moldea I would shift the "critical evaluation of books out of the
intellectual marketplace and into the courtroom."'63
Most significantly, the Times de-emphasized the search for the
true meaning of the cryptic Milkovich opinion, and instead of-
fered a workable and relatively simple test to determine wheth-
er libel claims arising out of book reviews should withstand
summary judgment. The Times'argued that liability should arise
from a review "only when interpretations are unsupportable by
reference to the reviewed work."" According to the Times,
such a standard would protect "rational interpretation," which in
turn 'serves First Amendment principles by allowing an au-
thor... interpretive license .... .,165 If the critic could point to
any passage in the book under review that supported her conclu-
sion, the book's author could thus steadfastly disagree with the
review but not recover for libel. Because Eskenazi could find
some support for his criticisms in the text of Interference, the
Times believed the district court should have dismissed Moldea's
complaint.
D. Moldea II: Strategic Retreat
The counterattack worked. On May 3, 1994, without benefit of
oral argument, and much to the shock of all concerned, Judge
Edwards, joined by Judge Wald, "confess[ed] error" and
"amend[ed their] earlier decision." 6 Judge Edwards wrote of
the distress felt by a judge who, in grappling with a very
note 125, at 2, and would "impede artistic progress," id. at 4. The other amici added
that Moldea I would "render actionable many of the most outstanding book reviews
of recent years-those which have earned the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished criti-
cism." Association Motion, supra note 124, at 5.
163. New York Times Petition for Rehearing, supra note 154, at 4; see id. at 13;
PEN Motion and Brief, supra note 125, at iv ("It is totally inappropriate to intro-
duce the clumsy, literal tools of libel law to such an undertaking."); id. at 12 ("Un-
like the typical book critics, knowledgeable as to the subjects reviewed, judges, in all
but the most fortuitous circumstances, will lack more than rudimentary knowledge of
the subject at hand.").
164. New York Times Petition for Rehearing, supra note 154, at 8 (citing Masson
v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 519 (1991)).
165. Id. at 4 (quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 519).
166. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.2d 310, 311 (D.C. Cir.) (Moldea II), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994).
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difficult legal issue, concludes that he has made a mistake of
judgment. Once discovered, confessing error is relatively
easy. What is difficult is accepting the realization that, de-
spite your best efforts, you may still fall prey to an error of
judgment... . I will take refuge in an aphorism of Justice-
Frankfurter: Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought
not to reject it merely because it comes late.167
The now-unanimous court completely adopted the arguments
advanced by the Times and the amici. In Judge Edwards's view,
Moldea I short-sightedly
fail[ed] to take sufficient account of the fact that the state-
ments at issue appeared in the context of a book review, a
genre in which readers expect to find spirited critiques of
literary works that they understand to be the reviewer's
description and assessment of texts that are capable of a
number of possible rational interpretations."
Judge Edwards emphasized that critics need "a degree of 'inter-
pretive license,'.., some leeway to offer 'rational interpretation'
of ambiguous sources."'69 The court now held that "when a re-
viewer offers commentary that is tied to the work being re-
viewed, and that is a supportable interpretation of the author's
work, that interpretation does not present a verifiable issue of
fact that can be actionable in defamation."" ° In the case of a
book review that consists "solely of the reviewer's comments on
a literary work," the "readers' expectations and understanding"
involve "assessments of a book [and not] direct assaults on [the
author's] character, reputation, or competence." " Judge Ed-
wards continued, "[we believe that the Times has suggested the
appropriate standard for evaluating critical reviews: '[tihe prop-
er analysis would make commentary actionable only when the
interpretations are unsupportable by reference to the written
work.",2 72
167. Id. at 311 (citation omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 313 (quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 518-19).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 315.
172. Id. (quoting New York Times Petition for Rehearing, supra note 154, at 8).
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Taking its cue from the Times's petition for rehearing,73 the
court relied on the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Masson v.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,74 for the proposition that "protec-
tion for rational interpretation serves First Amendment princi-
ples by allowing an author the interpretive license that is neces-
sary when relying upon ambiguous sources." 75 While "a critic's
latitude is not unlimited, he or she must be given the consti-
tutional 'breathing space' appropriate to the genre."76 The
court explained:
"[Tlhe supportable interpretation" standard provides that a
critic's interpretation must be rationally supportable by refer-
ence to the actual text he or she is evaluating, and thus
would not immunize situations analogous to that presented
in Milkovich, in which a writer launched a personal attack,
rather than interpreting a book.... For instance, if the
Times review stated that Interference was a terrible" book
because it asserted that African-Americans make poor foot-
ball coaches, that reading would be "unsupportable by ref-
erence to the written work," because nothing in Moldea's
book even hints at this notion. In such a case, the usual in-
quiries as to libel would apply: a jury could determine that
the review falsely characterized Interference, thereby libeling
its author by portraying him as a racist (assuming the other
elements of the case could be proved).177
The "correct measure of the challenged statements' verifiabili-
ty as a matter of law is whether no reasonable person could find
that the review's characterizations were supportable interpreta-
tions of Interference."7" Because the statements that Eskenazi
offered in support of his "too much sloppy journalism" conclusion
(the "sinister" meeting and the foul play allegations) were "sup-
ported by revealed premises that [the court could not] hold to be
false in the context of a book review,"'79 summary judgment
173. New York Times Petition for Rehearing, supra note 154, at 4, 8, 14.
174. 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
175. Moldea II, 22 F.3d at 316 (quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 519).
176. Id. at 315 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964)).
177. Id. (emphases added).
178. Id. at 317.
179. Id.
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was properly granted.
E. The Morning After
Understandably, the Times and their allies from the main-
stream press were exuberant. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch
opined that "[a]rtistic criticism could not survive if everyone
whose work is panned could scream 'libel."'180 The Houston
Chronicle editorialized that while Moldea I "would have had a
serious chilling effect on opinion and commentary in America,"
Moldea H "should help safeguard the right of free expres-
sion." 8' More broadly, "[a]nyone who 'believes in a vigorous
free press should be glad" for Moldea II because "[flor the Unit-
ed States to remain free requires an unfettered press. That in-
cludes the ability to express strong, clear opinions without fear
of retribution."'82 The New York Times itself intoned, "broad
protection for strong literary and other criticism is part of the
lifeblood of a literate democracy as well as our own
enterprise."' The court's adoption of -the "supportable inter-
pretation" test for determining whether a review may be libelous
was necessary; "[a]ny lesser safeguard would stifle public
discourse."' The Times further expounded that the "whole so-
ciety, freer to speak and argue about matters of public concern,
[wa]s the winner.""
Legal observers, some more impartial than others, also salut-
ed Moldea II. Media lawyer Karl Olson characterized Moldea II
as "a touchdown."88 Different contexts require different legal
standards and the "extremely deferential" "supportable interpre-
tation" standard was "clearly right."87 Libel expert Robert
180. Upon Further Review, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 18, 1994, at 6B.
181. Right of Opinion, HOUSTON CHRON., May 13, 1994, at 14; see also The Right
to an Opinion, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 5, 1994, at 41A (stating that if Moldea I
had been affirmed, "[criticism would have been tamed to the point of paralysis").
182. 'Breathing Space' for Opinions, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 6, 1994, at A16.
183. Critical Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1994, at A22.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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Sack thought Moldea II was "right on" because it articulated "a
workable protection for literary, artistic, and other criticism.""s
Of course, the Times legal team was delighted. Bruce Sanford
said that the "supportable interpretation" test provided the
"wide breathing space necessary for book reviews."'' 9 Ken
Starr commented, "on behalf of the amici, we are enormously
proud of the court."
190
Many also marveled that the judges in the Moldea I majority,
Judges Edwards and Wald, so candidly and totally admitted the
error of their ways. Appellate lawyer Bruce Ennis characterized
the judges' reversal as "extraordinarily rare."'91 Robert Sack
said, "I don't recall ever having seen a panel so thoroughly over-
rule itself in any field of law."'92 Rod Smolla thought the turn-
around was "inexplicable" because the first time around Chief
Judge Mikva strongly dissented, "which means 'they argued this
out, thought this out, thrashed it out.'""' Bruce Sanford ob-
served that he had "never seen anything like this in the First
Amendment area."'94 Sanford proclaimed the reversal was "a
testament to the quality of the man and the judge," while his co-
counsel, Henry Hoberman, chimed in that the change in decision
was "so unusual in American jurisprudence that it [was] espe-
cially important to give credit to the intellectual honesty of a
judge who could admit his mistake, rather than stand by a deci-
sion that may have done great harm."'95 Ken Starr, too, doffed
his cap: "as a former member of the court, I am enormously
proud of the court for doing the right thing, and doing so ele-
gantly, by engaging in additional reflection and review. This is
188. D.C. Circuit Amends Decision in "Shoddy Journalism" Action, MEDIA. L. REP.,
May 10, 1994, at 2 [hereinafter D.C. Circuit Amends].
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. David Streitfeld, Judges Switch Sides in a Libel Suit, WASH. POST, May 4,
1994, at C1, Cll.
192. D.C. Circuit Amends, supra note 188, at 4.
193. Streitfeld, supra note 191, at Cll.
194. Id.
195. Id. (emphases added). Could it have been a sexist oversight that the suits who
represented the Times failed to acknowledge the courage of Judge Patricia Wald,
who joined both of Judge Edwards's opinions?
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the court system operating at its very best."'96
The reversal also prompted discussion of the colorful history
of judicial recantation. Perhaps the best-known example in-
volved Baron Bramwell's succinct admission in an 1872 British
case: "The matter does not appear to me now as it appears to'
have appeared to me then."'9 7 Also prominently mentioned was
the Abe Lincoln story:
"One morning Lincoln argued an-issue for a client. That af-
ternoon, he argued the other side of the issue for a different
client. So the judge said, 'Counselor, didn't you argue the
opposite of that viewpoint this morning?'
"And Lincoln said, 'Yes, your honor. This morning I
thought I was right. This afternoon, I know I'm right." 98
Moldea presented his quite different reaction in a column in
the Los Angeles Times:
Since the suit was filed, editorials and Op-Ed columns
have relentlessly portrayed me as a thin-skinned author with
a "wounded ego" who simply received a bad review .... [The
media response to Moldea 1] was an avalanche of editorials
and Op-Ed columns fiercely condemning and misrepresenting
the ruling.... Then on May 3, the appellate court inexplica-
bly reversed itself. Without the benefit of any new evidence,
legal precedent or oral argument ... [the court did] nothing
less than declare an open season for unchecked criticism of
authors and their published works.9 9
Moldea's attorney, Roger Simmons, complained that Judge
Edwards's second opinion was "very uncertain as to what the
196. D.C. Circuit Amends, supra note 188, at 4.
197. Eugene R. Fidell, Admitting Error: A Proud Judicial Heritage, RECORDER, May
25, 1994, at 9.
198. Streitfeld, supra note 191, at Cl (quoting Roger C. Simmons).
199. Dan E. Moldea, Can a Bad Book Review Ruin a Writing Career?, LA. TIMES,
May 29, 1994, at M2, M6; see also Tamar Lewin, In Reversal, Appeals Court Dis-
misses Libel Suit Against Times, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1994, at A21 (quoting Moldea
as stating that between Moldea I and Moldea II "the only new contribution has been
the avalanche of misleading articles and editorials overreacting to this decision. I
think it's legitimate to question what impact all of that had on this very bizarre
reversal.").
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law is and ought to be in this area" and "in very sharp contrast
to his opinion of 10 weeks ago, which was very clear, specific,
and self-confident. The second decision cannot be reconciled with
Milkovich or Masson."'' He believed that his client had a
"good shot at Supreme Court review, especially given the em-
phasis placed on this case in the mass media." ' ' He filed the
certiorari petition, seeking Supreme Court review of whether the
"broader context" in which a statement appears nullifies an oth-
erwise valid libel claim, and whether the First Amendment
requires a "supportable interpretation" standard for a defamato-
ry statement that appears in a review.0 2
Unfortunately for Moldea and his attorneys, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari on October 3, 1994.203 The denial trig-
gered yet another round of media kudos for the wise judges of
Moldea IV.4 The Times issued the mild statement that it was
"'gratified that the U.S. Supreme Court s[aw] no need to review
a case that continues time-honored common-law and constitu-
tional protection for literary criticism.""'2 5
The Times's attorneys were considerably less gracious win-
ners. George Freeman stated: "we were very pleased with the
Supreme Court's actions and are glad the case is over. We never
thought the litigation had any merit."0 6 Henry S. Hoberman,
Bruce Sanford's colleague, expressed relief that "finally, after
nearly a four-year odyssey through the courts, this case has
come to its rightful end. The time-honored arena of opinion and
commentary is safe from the red-ink of would-be censors and
opinion police like Mr. Moldea." °7 Sanford modestly offered
that the "supportable interpretation" test is a "very important
200. D.C. Circuit Amends, supra note 188, at 2.
201. Id. at 3.
202. 63 U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1994).
203. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994).
204. See, e.g., Libel in Reviews: The Book Is Still Open, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1994,
at B6 ("We hope all forms of opinion will be more secure because of this decision.");
Libel Suit, supra note 53, at A14 ("The court's decision was . . . a victory for the
readers of this newspaper and any other publication that contains criticism.").
205. Hernandez, supra note 69, at 20 (quoting the New York Times).
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standard" and Moldea II is the "most important libel decision
since New York Times."208
F. Hard Cases, Bad Law?
As the court acknowledged in Moldea II, "[tihis [wals a diffi-
cult case.' 29 Despite the substantial equities on Moldea's be-
half in his struggle with the Times, Moldea I, like Milkovich,
took the counterintuitive position that context was irrele-
vant.21° Moldea I would have exacerbated the language inter-
pretation difficulties intrinsic to all libel actions21' by requiring
that judges and juries interpret literary texts, a task for which
they are ill-equipped. This is certainly true in the context of
commentary upon the arts. Whether great latitude is as justified
for commentary on poetry as for Moldea's nonfiction is less clear,
but a test that varied depending upon whether the subject of the
review was a work of "art" would present excruciating line-draw-
ing difficulties.1 2
208. Id.
209. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 320 (D.C. Cir.) (Moldea II), cert.
denied, 115 S.- Ct. 202 (1994).
210. See Olson, supra note 186, at 8. ( [lln real estate, the three most important
factors are 'location, location and location;' in defamation law the three most impor-
tant factors in determining whether you have a defamatory factual statement ...
are 'context, context and context.").
211. See Hanson, supra note 45, at 43 (arguing that modern theories of language
and meaning should undergird First Amendment jurisprudence).
212. Moldea I at least implicitly recognized such a distinction. See, e.g., Moldea v.
New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1145 n.6 D.C. Cir.) (Moldea 1), rev'd, 22 F.3d
310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994).
Eskenazi's assessment of Moldea [sic] goes to the discrete and factbound
efforts of an investigative journalist, and the assessment clearly concludes
that Moldea's work as a journalist is less than competent.
There is a distinction, after all, between accusing a physician of
practicing "bad science," as opposed to "clumsy brain surgery." In the
instant case, Eskenazi accused Moldea not of failing in some amorphous,
value-laden respect such as writing style; but rather suggested that he
failed, as a journalist, to present information that was accurate and that
had not been aired before. What is at issue in this case is not, as the
dissent says, "a general assessment of. . . the quality of an author's
book." We do not hold that it is possible to verify whether Moldea's work
is in fact "sloppy;" but rather that this characterization rests on verifiable
underlying facts.
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Moldea II provides substantial protection to writers and pub-
lishers of commentary, and presumably not just artistic cri-
tiques. Key aspects of newspapers and magazines-arts reviews,
op-ed and editorial pieces, and perhaps even letters to the edi-
tor-will be shielded from libel liability.
How sweeping a protection the ruling provides, however, is
not entirely clear. In Moldea II, the court pointed out that the
"critic's latitude is not unlimited."1 ' If the courts insist that a
reviewer prove the reasonableness of her interpretation, then
the threat of liability may result in some measure of control over
the vitriol of a displeased critic. From the example provided by
the court, however,214 only in an exceedingly rare case could a
reviewer fail to point to anything, anywhere, in the work under
review that supported her negative conclusions. Such a test
would represent a First Amendment analog to the toothless
"rational basis" test familiar to Fourteenth Amendment doctrine,
a hands-off approach recently explained by Justice Clarence
Thomas:
This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint....
[T]hose attacking the rationality of the legislative classifi-
cation have the burden "to negative every conceivable basis
which might support it."... [A] legislative choice is not sub-
ject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.215
If this standard turns out to be the approach, then Dan Moldea
was clearly right; it will be "open season" on authors."
The Times's George Freeman thinks that Moldea 11 provided
broad protection-that it will have "no effect" on his pre-publica-
tion review of the Times's non-news items." Other media ob-
servers believe that because Moldea II even countenanced the
idea of liability arising out of commentary, it will now be nec-
213. Moldea II, 22 F.3d at 315.
214. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
215. FCC v. Beach Comm. Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101-02 (1993) (citation omitted).
In constitutional law circles this test has been variously termed the "babbling idiot,"
the "straight jacket," or the "giggle" test.
216. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
217. Hernandez, supra note 69, at 21.
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essary to provide pre-publication "lawyering" of commentary.218
Moldea I and Moldea II also taught that dire predictions of
the imminent collapse of democracy can prod the judiciary to
protect the media's power to destroy reputations with virtual
impunity,219 while the flood of lawsuits that was predicted
would overwhelm newspapers after Moldea 1' never tran-
spired."2
Moldea v. New York Times also reminds us that, despite all
the fancy rhetoric about "the marketplace of ideas," access to the
market is quite different if you are a Dan Moldea rather than a
New York Times.' This inherent unfairness doubles when the
media can take advantage of the best legal representation that
money can buy. As Moldea's story proves, the media is able to
close ranks and throw its weight around just as effectively as
the health insurance industry, pharmaceutical manufacturers, or
any other collection of corporate behemoths.'
Whether viewed broadly or narrowly, Moldea II, with its spe-
cial rules for libel arising out of commentary, adds yet another
intricacy to First Amendment doctrine, an area already both
218. Henry L. Kaufinan & Michael Cantwell, Moldea II: Are Reviews Protected?,
PUBLISHERS WKLY., Oct. 24, 1994, at 39.
219. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) (holding
that a reporter's deliberate misquoting was protected by the First Amendment as
long as it does not materially misrepresent the speaker's statement); Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (finding that the First Amendment precludes tort recov-
ery by rape victim identified by newspaper); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
-323 (1974) (holding that the First Amendment requires that public officials and
public figures bringing libel claims prove that the publisher intentionally lied or pub-
lished with reckless disregard for the truth); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (finding that the First Amendment allows newspaper to
refuse to print response of political candidate criticized by the newspaper).
220. See supra notes 106-23 and accompanying text.
221. See Hernandez, supra note 69, at 20 (quoting Times counsel George Freeman
as saying that Moldea II "should be the death knell for any onslaught of claims by
plaintiffs suing about reviews. Not that we've seen any groundswell.").
222. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1641-42 (1967) (arguing that the marketplace theory is based
on a "romantic" conception that is divorced from reality); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech
and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986) (stating that the "marketplace of
ideas," once freely accessible to the public, has been foreclosed to all but the
wealthy).
223. Justice Byron White made this point in his lengthy and thoughtful dissent in
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 369 (White, J., dissenting).
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byzantine and balkanized. 4 This result is a problem not only
for judges, but also for lawyers, because excessively complex law
may lead to poor advice.'
In the end, perhaps the best argument for Moldea II is the
most familiar one in libel law-the need to provide the media
the "breathing space" it needs "to survive."' Allowing jury
evaluation of the wisdom of a reviewer's conclusions "would
allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes
or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular
expression." 7 Without substantial protection from civil liabili-
ty, "the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would
give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First
Amendment freedoms cannot survive." m
G. Epilogue
Who won and who lost?
The judges, lavishly praised by most observers, came up win-
ners. 9 Moldea II produced few critics. One critic, noted
plaintiffs attorney Martin London, noted that because "the press
went berserk" after Moldea I, Judge Edwards "kneeled at the
224. See Logan, supra note 10, at 497 (arguing for a unified First Amendment
theory). But see Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Inter-
pretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (noting that
the First Amendment protects varying interests in varying ways); Steven H. Shiffrin,
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983) (arguing that the subordinate po-
sition of commercial speech in First Amendment law is artificial). Libel law is espe-
cially messy, with convoluted constitutional analysis overlaying the arcana of the
common law. See Logan, supra note 10, at 494-95.
225. On the other hand, complex law gives law lrofessors something to write
about.
226. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1962)).
227. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (holding that the
First Amendment precludes liability for the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress arising out of "caricature").
228. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278.
229. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text. This outcome is not so clear
as to Judge Mikva, who decided to resign from the D.C. Court of Appeals shortly
after Moldea II to become White House Counsel for a politically weak and legally
endangered president. This could be viewed as the professional equivalent of han
kari.
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altar of the establishment press.""0 Carlin Romano, current
head of the National Book Critics Circle, suggested that the
career ambitions of Judges Edwards and Wald prompted them
to reverse field, and that Moldea II, at least in part, was their
attempt to recapture the favor of a pro-civil liberties White
House." These barbs drew sharp retorts from noted appellate
attorneys Bruce Ennis (I think it is unimaginable those two
judges bowed to pressure")" 2 and Bruce Sanford ("I think that
it is insulting to say that they bowed to the press").'
The lawyers for the Times came up winners too, especially
because Moldea 11 relied so heavily on the policy arguments and
analytical framework offered in the Times's petition for rehear-
ing. At a more personal level, Ken Starr reentered high visibility
public service as the Whitewater independent counsel,' and
Bruce Sanford is using Moldea II as a marketing tool in support
of the new edition of his libel treatise.' Roger Simmons's pro-
ifile as a litigator undoubtedly rose as a result of his representa-
tion of Moldea; he got more attention in the press in 1994 than
any lawyer from Frederick, Maryland, could fairly expect in a
lifetime.
As for Gerald Eskenazi, whose book review triggered Moldea
230. Impact of "Sloppy Journalism" Ruling Disputed at Conference, MEDIA L. REP.,
Nov. 22, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Impact].
231. Romano, supra note 55, at 779-80. Romano also points out "an unusual com-
ment" by Judge Mikva the day after Moldea II came down: "[Judges Edwards and
Wald] are very strong minded judges.... They don't cave to pressure. Even good
pressure.... I didn't send them copies of the editorials or anything. They could
read these on their own." Id. at 779.
Judge Wald, when later asked about the reversal in opinion, replied that it
"was quite a close case," and:
The important thing is to get it right-even if that means admitting you
made a mistake. That's what we did in this case. I knew we were going
to get pilloried, but we lasted it out, and we moved on. That's what life
tenure is all about.
Legends in the Law; A Conversation with Patricia Wald, BAR REP. (Wash. D.C.),
Apr./May 1995, at 10, 11.
232. Streitfeld, supra note 191, at Cl.
233. Impact, supra note 230, at 3.
234. See supra note 146.
235. See advertising flyer for SANFORD, supra note 15 (copy on file with the author)
(identifying Sanford as a "Noted First Amendment Lawyer, Who Recently Argued
and Won Dan E. Moldea v. The New York Times Company, Inc.").
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v. New York Times, he continues to report on sports for the
Times, has completed his Yastrzemski biography, 6 but has
written no more Times book reviews."
And, finally, what about Dan Moldea?
Although steadfastly insisting that he had been a victim of
"corporate tyranny,"'  Moldea admitted after the Supreme
Court denied certiorari, that he had to "get a life." 9 His next
project is a book on the police investigation into the assassina-
tion of Robert Kennedy. When asked how he thought the Times
would review it, he said, "rm sure they'll be very fair."'24
236. CARL YASTRZEMSRI & GERALD ESKENAZI, YAZ: BASEBALL, THE WALL, AND ME
(1990).
237. Search of LEXIS, News library, Papers file (Sept. 25, 1995).
238. David Streitfeld, The Booksellers' Circus; Their Conventions Are Contentious
Affairs, But 1994's May Take the Cake, WASH. POST, June 1, 1994, at B1, B12.
239. David Streitfeld, Moldea Appeal Rejected, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1994, at E2.
240. Id. And you know, Moldea was right. See Christopher Lehmann-IIaupt, Open
Door to Conspiracy Theories, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1995, at C20 (stating that
Moldea's new book is "carefully reasoned and ultimately persuasive," in part because
he "meticulously dissects" the evidence).
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